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L

aw and economics is a methodology that helps answer three types of questions:
What effect do legal rules have on individuals' behavior?
How should legal rules be desigped to increase human well-being?
How does the &sign of legal iGtitutions affect the content of le&l rules?
In the area of private law, where law and economics has its main c o n t i b u t i ~ & e
focus is on the ability of legal rules to create incentives for private parties to be'h?f~ein
conformity with social goals. How should liability rules in tort law be designed to
,
promote incentives for care and reasonable safety? What remedies for breach of contract
provide private transactors with sufficient regard for the interest of their contracting
partners? What bundle of ownership rights is necessary to induce creation of new
property by individuals? How do trial procedures and settlement patterns affect the value
of substantive rights?
Economic theory derives most of its analytical prowess from the assumption that
individual decision-makers conduct their affairs in a rational manner, namely, that they
are consistent in their pursuit of their subjective goals and interests. A variety of
economic methods have been imported into law to sharpen our understanding of the
effects that legal rules have on rational actors. The clearer understanding of the incentives
of individuals and the pattern by which they will react to social regulation is important
for the evaluation of rules and their ability to promote any desirable set of policy
concerns. The economist is, in a way, a skepticist who is concerned with the limits of
implementation: how far can legal rules affect private behavior and what are the bounds
of societfs power to control individuals?
Exploiting such tools, my own research has demonstrated various patterns of behavior
that are likely to arise under specific legal rules. For example, in a recent paper with
Professor Lisa Bernstein of the University of Chicago ("The Secrecy Interest in Contract
Law," 109 Yale Law Journal 1885). economic analysis was utilized to challenge the
wisdom of prominent contract and commercial law doctrines. Consider a party who
wishes to sue for remedy for breach of contract. Under current law, this party is required
to &close information about its business operations that is necessary to assess its losses
from breach and its actions to reduce the loss. If this aggrieved party has, for any one of
numerous reasons, a secrecy interest in these operations, it might be reluctant to sue and
undergo the costly scrutiny of its business and the discovery of its private information.
This party might, in fact, prefer to entirely forego the compensatory remedy in order to
protect its secrecy interest. Recognizing this incentive to protect information suggests
that various remedial provisions in the law are ill-suited to provide the relief for which
they are intended. Thus, economic analysis demonstrates that the traditional goal of
contractual remedies - to make the aggrieved party "whole" - may be better served by
remedies such as specific performance and summanly enforced liquidated damages that
do not demand proof of actual loss and do not permit the defendant a broad scope
of discovery.
The economic analysis is employed here, as in many other places, not to prescribe a
social policy, but to better understand the fitness of a particular legal doctrine to achieve
its stated goals. In this or in other areas of law, the normative implications of the
economic analysis may be embraced, or rejected on the basis of other, non-utilitarian
concerns. Either way, the analysis highlights the cost and the feasibility of choosing any
social course of action.
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